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Skills shortages and skill mismatch are a pressing concern for policymakers in several
developing countries, and in East Asia specifically. Providing on-the-job training can
be an effective policy tool to shape the skills of the existent workforce to the
specific needs of the firms. This paper explores a unique data set of matched
employer-employee data for Malaysia and Thailand to estimate the wage return to
on-the-job training in these two countries. Exploring propensity score matching
estimates, we show that the average wage returns to on-the-job training are 7.7%
for Malaysia and 4.5% for Thailand. Furthermore, we find evidence that the wage
returns to on-the-job training are higher for males than for females in Malaysia
and that, for both countries, returns are higher for workers with at least secondary
education.
JEL Classification codes: J24; J30
Keywords: On-the-job training; Wages; Matched employer-employee data1. Introduction
Many economists have emphasized the importance of human capital accumulation for
growth (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; Aghion-Howitt, 1998). Human capital accumu-
lation is done throughout life, but more than one half of this lifetime accumulation is
done on-the-job after completing formal schooling (e.g., Heckman et al., 1998). In spite
of the importance, much more is known about the investment in formal schooling,
and specifically on the returns to formal schooling, than on the investment in on-the-job
training and their returns.
This paper explores a matched employer-employee data set with unique information
on formal firms and their workers for two developing countries with very different
levels of development, Malaysia and Thailand1. According to the World Economic
Outlook Database from 2005, the per capita GDP in 2002 was 3,880 USD in Malaysia
and 1,994 USD in Thailand and in 2004 was 4,624 USD and 2,521 USD, respectively2.
Between 2002 and 2004, these economies were growing at similar rates (5.6% and
6.1%). In terms of population, Thailand more than doubles the size of Malaysia (65m
vs. 25m). Both countries present a high literacy rate of around 93%. East Asian coun-
tries have been drawing a great deal of attention to themselves. Impressive growth
rates, competitive wages and high levels of education of the workforce are just some
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namics of these labor markets and their investment in job training.
In developing countries, governments are increasingly concerned with the rapidly
changing demand for skills and the slow response of the general and vocational school-
ing tracks to adjust the provision of skills. As a consequence, many employers complain
about the lack of skills and education of their workforce. Policymakers are thus increas-
ingly concerned that the supply of skills in the labor market does not keep pace with
the demand. The investment by firms in on-the-job training is one important way to
mitigate this skills’ gap as it develops job relevant skills among the existing workforce.
The evidence on both the incidence and the economic returns to on-the-job training
is generally scarce in developing countries3. And it is unclear how different the returns
should be in developed and developing countries. On the one hand, the returns to the
investment in job training (as well as in schooling) could be higher in developing than
in developed countries simply because skilled labor is scarcer in developing countries
(e.g. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). On the other hand, if skilled labor and capital
are complements, the returns to this investment could be smaller in developing coun-
tries, where capital is relatively scarce.
In theory, whether workers with and without on-the-job training receive, all else con-
stant, significantly different wages will also relate to whether the training offered gen-
eral or firm specific skills. It may also relate to whether there are differences in the
competitiveness of the local labor markets. When the labor market is perfectly com-
petitive and training is general, workers will support the cost of job training through
lower wages during that same period. Once training is received, the worker will be paid
the equivalent to his marginal productivity, which we now assume to be higher (e.g.
Becker, 1964). But when training is firm specific the costs and benefits will likely be
shared between the firm and the worker depending on the bargaining power of each
one of them. In principle, the worker will receive a lower wage at the time of the train-
ing, to account for his share of the costs, and a higher wage after the training event, de-
pending on the benefit he could extract from the firm (e.g. Leuven and Oosterbeek,
2001). If the labor market is not competitive and firms are able to pay a wage lower
than the worker’s marginal productivity, firms will only want to invest in training if the
increase in productivity is higher than the effect in the growth rate of wages (e.g.
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). Even in this scenario, there is no theoretical reason for
the wages to decrease after the training program. They should increase or remain constant.
In sum, no matter the assumptions we have, theory predicts that after participating in a
training event the worker’s wage should increase or stay invariable. Finally, as training is a
decision variable for the firm one expects wage returns to job training to be a lower bound
estimate for the impact of training in firm productivity4.
This paper estimates whether the firm’s investment in job training translates into
higher wages for the workers in Malaysia and in Thailand. Our findings show that the
wage returns to the investment in job training decrease significantly as one controls for
worker’s and firm’s characteristics. We find that on-the-job training is associated with
increases in individual wages of 7.7% in Malaysia and 4.5% in Thailand. We also esti-
mate that wage returns to on-the-job training tend to be quantitatively higher for men
than for women although in Thailand they are not statistically significant for males. In
Malaysia, the returns for males are 11% while for women they are not statistically
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port higher returns to on-the-job training than other workers (returns are 9% and 10%
for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively).
In the empirical work, we start from a simple worker level Mincer type equation re-
lating hourly wages with several observable worker and firm characteristics, including
differences in the incidence of on-the-job training. Our main coefficient of interest
quantifies the average effect on wages of having received on-the-job training. However,
the estimation of the effect of on-the-job training on wages poses a major challenge as
training is likely to be an endogenous variable to wages. On-the-job training is a choice
variable for both firms and workers and most likely is also correlated with worker and
firm characteristics, which in turn are also correlated with labor productivity and
wages. Failure to control in a flexible manner for these characteristics may create a bias
in the estimates of the effect of training on wages, as workers selecting into training
may have different characteristics. In our empirical approach, we hope to minimize this
problem by exploring a rich data set with many worker and firm characteristics and the
propensity score matching (PSM) method. When compared to ordinary least squares
(OLS), the PSM estimates allow for a more flexible (non-linear) functional form relat-
ing observable worker characteristics and their wages.
The propensity to score matching method is developed in two steps. First, it estimates
the probability of each worker to be selected into the training provided by the firm, given
his or her observable characteristics. Based on this probability, it generates a “control
group” of workers that did not participate in the training but whose probability of being se-
lected into on-the-job training was very similar to the probability observed for the sample
of trained individuals. These workers are very “similar” to those actually participating in
training in all their observable characteristics (e.g., education, occupation in the labor mar-
ket, years of experience). The only thing that distinguishes them from the trained workers
is the sole fact of not having received on-the-job training. Hence, the wage difference be-
tween these two groups can be fully attributed to the wage impacts of on-the-job training.
Our empirical findings document two interesting patterns across the two countries.
First, the incidence of on-the-job training differs significantly by several worker and
firm characteristics. In particular, we find that the more educated and more tenured
workers are, in both countries, the more likely they are to receive on-the-job training.
We also show that larger, more innovative foreign firms are also more likely to invest
in on-the-job training. Second, there is strong evidence that the workers’ wages increase
with the incidence of on-the-job training in both countries. In our preferred estimates ex-
ploring propensity score matching, the average wage returns to on-the-job training are
7.7% in Malaysia and 4.5% in Thailand. Furthermore, the heterogeneity analysis shows
that in Malaysia the wage returns to job training are larger for men (11%) than for women
(for whom they are not statistically different from zero). We also find that in both coun-
tries there are higher wage returns to job training for workers with completed secondary
education or more years of education when compared to those who have not completed
secondary education. The returns to on-the-job training for workers with at least second-
ary education are 9% in Malaysia and 10% in Thailand, respectively. In contrast, for
workers with lower levels of education, there is no evidence of positive wage impacts both
for Malaysia and Thailand. These findings clearly reinforce the idea that the investment in
job training is complementary to the initial level of education of workers.
Almeida and Faria IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 4 of 332014, 3:19
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/19Our paper relates closely to two empirical literatures. First, it relates to the work ana-
lyzing the firm’s investment in on-the-job training in developing countries (e.g., Ariga
and Brunello, 2002, Almeida and Aterido, 2010, 2011, Almeida, 2010 and Almeida and
Cho, 2012). The main empirical patterns found in these papers for developing countries
are close to the findings found for developed countries (e.g., Bassinini et al. 2005). Larger,
more open and innovative firms, with a more skilled workforce and operating in more
technologically intensive sectors are more likely to train their employees. The major ex-
ception is Ariga and Brunello (2002). Exploring an employee survey for Thailand in 2001,
they find a significant and negative relationship between years of formal educational and
training.
Second, we relate to the empirical work quantifying the wage returns to on-the-job
training exploring worker level data5. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes some of
the main empirical studies quantifying the wage returns to on-the-job training, for de-
veloping and developed countries. Panels A and B report the estimates from papers
using worker level data. Panel A refers to developed countries and Panel B to develop-
ing countries6. A word of caution is needed when comparing cross country estimates of
the returns to on-the-job training. First, the variable capturing on-the-job training dif-
fers significantly across data sets yielding reduced comparability across studies. Second,
there is little comparability in the reduced form equation used across most of the
analysis7.
The point estimates reported in Panel A for developed countries are very diverse.
Some studies report positive and significant wage returns to training. However, more
recently, as longitudinal data becomes available and experimental methods are used,
the wage returns to on-the-job training tend to be smaller than in the cross section
studies. Furthermore, in some cases, the returns are even zero (e.g., Leuven and Oosterbeek,
2002, 2004)8. The point estimates for most developing countries, reported in Panel B, are
generally in the order of 20%. The evidence in the panel is also quite diverse. Chung (2000)
and Johanson and Wanga (2008) explore cross sectional data and find evidence of large
returns (between 20% and 38%) for Malaysia and Tanzania, respectively. On the other hand,
Frazer (2006) finds that in Ghana, during the 90s, the returns to apprenticeship training
were not statistically different from zero. Monk et al. (2008) find in addition some hetero-
geneity within the country and across education levels. They show that the returns of
apprenticeships are 50% for individuals with no education but decline as education
raises. They find evidence that the returns are zero for individuals with more than
6 years of formal education.
The methodology in our paper is closer to Rosholm et al. (2007). They estimate that
the returns to training are on average 21% for Kenya and that in Zambia training is not
associated with higher wages. Like us, they also explore a matched employer and em-
ployee data set (collected by the World Bank) and a propensity score matching meth-
odology. However, the larger number of observations in our sample and the more
detailed information on worker and firm characteristics allowed us to conduct a deeper
analysis. First, we consider hourly wages as a dependent variable, while Rosholm et al.
(2005) consider only monthly wages. Second, we are able to control both for detailed
worker human capital characteristics and for several firm characteristics that they do
not. At the worker level, we include variables such as having received training at a
previous employer, owning a bank account and using the internet. These variables,
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training. At the firm level, we are able to control for the average years of schooling of
the workforce, for the degree of innovation or for the degree of exports.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset used and the descrip-
tive statistics. Particularly, in Section 2.1 we explain in detail our main dependent vari-
able of interest: the logarithm of workers’ hourly wages. In Section 3 we analyze which
variables determine the selection into training. Section 4 presents the propensity score
matching estimates for the wage returns to on-the-job training. In section 4.1, we ex-
plain the empirical model, and in section 4.2 we report the main empirical findings for
the wage returns to on-the-job training. In Section 5, we report heterogeneity analysis
by gender and level of education. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
We explore a matched employer-employee data set collected by the World Bank, En-
terprise Surveys, for Malaysia (2002) and Thailand (2004)9. A total of 1,152 firms were
surveyed in Malaysia and 1,385 in Thailand. For each firm, a random sample of 10 em-
ployees in each firm was interviewed yielding a total of 10,822 and 13,850 firm-worker
observations in Malaysia and Thailand, respectively. However, in the analysis we have
excluded observations with missing values for the main covariates of interest both at
the firm and worker level. As a result, the number of observations used will be 6,679
for Malaysia and to 9,418 for Thailand, respectively.
This data set has several advantages to study this topic. First, the questionnaire is
similar across the two countries, which ensures comparability of the results. Second,
the survey collects simultaneously detailed information on worker and firm characteris-
tics. In particular, at the firm level it collects information on the sector of activity, geo-
graphical location10, total number of employees, public and foreign ownership as well
as information on the human capital of the manager, on the average years of formal
education of the workforce, number of employees per occupation, and percentage of
women in the firm. The survey also gathers information on technological variables or
investments in new production technologies such as R&D expenses, introduction of
new products and adoption of new technologies. At the worker level, it collects infor-
mation on gender, age, marital status and nationality. Most importantly it also collects
detailed human capital characteristics like years of formal education, tenure with the
firm, years of experience in the labor market, and whether each worker enrolled in vo-
cational training programs in the past. Finally, the survey collects information on
whether the firm offered on-the-job training to their employees last year and whether
the employees interviewed took any formal training since they joined that firm. In
addition, monthly wages and hours of work per week are also reported.
In particular, the survey contains the following information about formal training
programs at the firm and at the worker level. At the firm level, the survey asks: “Did
your plant run formal in-house training programs for its employees in 2001?”, “ Did your
plant send employees to formal training programs run by other organizations during the
fiscal year of 2001”? At the worker level the survey asks: “Have you received formal
training since you joined this firm?”. Based on these two questions, we constructed two
variables capturing the incidence of on-the-job training at the firm and at the worker
level. First, we constructed a firm level dummy variable that equals one if the firm
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structed a worker level dummy variable that equals one if the worker has received for-
mal training since he joined that firm. In addition, for those workers whose the current
position is not their first job, we have information on whether the worker received
training at his previous job11.
Table A2 in the Appendix describes the main variables used. Tables A3 and A4 in the
Appendix report summary statistics for the main firm and worker characteristics used
in the paper. In Malaysia, the final sample covers manufacturing (79%) and services
(21%). In Thailand, the sample only covers manufacturing. In addition, the distribution
of firms across the two countries is different. While in Malaysia, small firms are ap-
proximately half of the sample, in Thailand, medium, large and very large firms account
for more than 70% of the sample. In the two countries, approximately 70% of the firms
are domestic owned and a large share exports at least some of their sales (66% in
Thailand and 62% in Malaysia). Rubber and Plastics (22%) and food processing (18%)
are the two more represented industries in Malaysia. In the Thai sample, firms are
more equally divided among the different sectors. Finally, firms in Malaysia have a
higher share of skilled labor (49%) than in Thailand (24%) and the average of years of
formal education is also slightly higher in Malaysia than in Thailand.
Finally, Table A3 also shows that the training incidence at the firm level is 51% in
Malaysia and 76% in Thailand12. The incidence of training is smaller in Malaysia in part
due to the low training incidence of job training among the firms operating in Rubber
and Plastics (36% of the firms train) and in Food Processing (55% of the firms train).
Also interestingly, in Malaysia most of the firms that offer training explore both facil-
ities in house and externally. Most of the training costs are supported directly by the
firms (at least formally, as firms can transfer the cost of training to employees through
lower wages). Only 6% of the firms for Malaysia and 3% for Thailand report to have
shared the costs of training with their employees13.
Table A4 in the Appendix computes summary statistics for the sample of workers in
both countries. In both samples women represent approximately half of the sample.
The average age, tenure and years of experience is also quite similar across the two
countries. Again, the human capital of the workforce is higher in Malaysia than in
Thailand. In Malaysia only 15% of the workers have up to primary education compared
with 30% of the workers in Thailand. In Malaysia there are also more workers with
polytechnic or vocational education than in Thailand (15% vs. 6%). This higher human
capital translates also into more skilled occupations in Malaysia than in Thailand in
our sample. While skilled production workers is the most represented group in the
Malaysian sample (36%), in Thailand, the most represented occupation group is un-
skilled production workers (37%). Also interestingly, Malaysian workers have been
more exposed to foreign languages and cultures. In particular, 7% of the Malaysian
workers but less than 1% of Thai workers studied in a foreign country.
Table A4 in the Appendix also shows that the incidence of on-the-job training
is higher in Thailand than in Malaysia also at the worker level. In Malaysia, 33%
of the workers report having received some training since they joined the firm. In
Thailand, this number is 52% of the workforce. The percentage of workers that
received training at the previous employer was 17% in Malaysia and 24% in
Thailand.
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The main dependent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage (in
USD)14. In Table 1 we present the average log hourly wage as well as the raw difference
in the average hourly wage for both trained and not trained workers.
The results in the table show that workers who report having received some formal
on-the-job training since joining the firm report higher earnings than non-trainees in
both countries. However, this difference in the average wages is likely capturing the ef-
fect of worker and firm characteristics that drive the selection of workers into training
and that, simultaneously, also influence their hourly wages.
3. The selection of firms and workers into training
In order to understand which variables influence the selection into on-the-job training
we run a series of regressions at the firm and worker level. We assume that firms de-
cide whether or not to train their workers if the profits from this investment are greater
than the costs:
Trainjfr ¼ 10




where Trainjfr is a dummy variable that equals one if firm j, operating in industry f and
region r offered on-the-job training to its employees during the year prior to the survey




Avg Ln wage 0.410 (0.778)
Avg Ln wage for the trained 0.698 (0.793)
Avg Ln wage for the non-trained 0.266 (0.729)
Difference in Avg Ln wage for the trained and the not trained 0.431*** (0.019)
Number of workers trained 2,215
Number of workers not trained 4,464
Total number of workers 6,679
Panel B: Thailand
Avg Ln wage −0.135 (0.715)
Avg Ln wage for the trained 0.000 (0.743)
Avg Ln wage for the non-trained −0.285 (0.657)
Difference in Avg Ln wage for the trained and the not trained 0.284*** (0.014)
Number of workers trained 4,941
Number of workers not trained 4,477
Total number of workers 9,418
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: We report the natural logarithm of hourly wage in USD at the time of the survey. * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of workers in Malaysia and Panel B
reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of workers in Thailand. Column (1) reports the mean of the variables
listed, and column (2) and reports standard errors.
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assume that π*jfr is linear so that π*jfr = δZjfr + μf + μr + εjfr, where Zjfr is a vector of firm
characteristics and μf are industry fixed effects, μr are region fixed effects, and εjfr
captures unobserved firm characteristics. Given this linear form, the probability that
firm j offers formal on-the-job training to its employees is given by:
Pr Trainjfr ¼ 1
  ¼ Pr νjfr > −δZjfr−μf −μr
 
ð2Þ
Assuming that the error term εjfr follows a normal distribution, equation (2) can beestimated by maximum likelihood (probit). Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix report
the estimates of different specifications of equation (2) in the text for Malaysia and
Thailand, respectively. Specifications (1) through (6) differ in the observable firm char-
acteristics that are included. In all specifications we control for two-digit ISIC industry
codes and for region dummies. Specification (7), which we will consider our baseline
specification of firm characteristics, includes the interaction of industry and region
fixed effects. In this specification, we control for size of the firm, age, export intensity,
foreign ownership, education of the workforce (including managerial education) and
degree of technological adoption. The findings show that training incidence increases
with firm size in both countries although not with age of the firm. Training incidence
increases also with the firm’s presence in external markets and with foreign ownership.
For example, in Malaysia, training incidence is 56.4 percentage points higher in a firm
with more than 250 employees than in a micro firm. We also find robust evidence that
training incidence increases with the human capital of the workforce (measured both
with years of education, skills of the workforce and by managerial education) and with
the degree of technological adoption in the firm.
In Tables A7 and A8 we replicate the estimation of equation (2) with maximum like-
lihood (probit model) but consider on-the-job training incidence at the worker level
as the dependent variable15. This analysis is a critical first step of the propensity score
matching methodology. We consider several observable characteristics that likely deter-
mine the selection into training and that we can quantify with our detailed data set.
We will then estimate the fitted values for each worker level observation. Therefore, for
each worker who has received training it is feasible to match him/her with a worker
with a close enough fitted probability. This group of workers will constitute the control
group in the estimation of the impacts of on-the-job training on wages.
Specifications (1) through (5) of Tables A7 and A8 always include the baseline firm
characteristics reported in column (7) of Tables A5 and A6. However, the set of worker
level characteristics differs across columns. Column (1), in addition to the baseline firm
characteristics, controls for the worker’s education (including vocational education),
gender, age, tenure with the firm, potential experience, marital status, occupation, if the
worker is an apprentice and if he belongs to a trade union. In columns (2) through (5)
we add dummy variables capturing if the worker has a computer at home (specification
2), owns a bank account (specification 3), uses regularly internet for transactions (speci-
fication 4) and has received training at a previous employer (specification 5). In Table 2,
we report the results for both countries exploring our preferred specification (specifica-
tion (5) in Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix).
Table 2 Average marginal effects and asymptotic errors from the worker level probit for
participation in training
Malaysia Thailand
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Degree 0.523*** [0.186] 0.426** [0.215]
Diploma 0.608*** [0.180] 0.353 [0.215]
Upper secondary 0.458*** [0.172] 0.226 [0.212]
Lower secondary 0.266 [0.172] 0.114 [0.211]
Primary 0.036 [0.176] −0.034 [0.209]
Vocational education 0.101** [0.049] −0.015 [0.059]
Woman −0.071 [0.038] −0.072* [0.030]
Age of worker 0.020 [0.019] 0.020 [0.016]
Tenure with the firm 0.069*** [0.001] 0.100*** [0.008]
Potential experience −0.032*** [0.009] −0.003 [0.008]
Single −0.146*** [0.045] 0.022 [0.033]
Manager 0.060 [0.066] −0.087 [0.070]
Professional 0.118 [0.078] −0.055 [0.059]
Skill production −0.017 [0.054] 0.181*** [0.046]
Unskilled production −0.269*** [0.062] 0.225*** [0.047]
Apprentice 0.506** [0.204] −0.234 [0.174]
Unionized 0.531*** [0.088] 0.628*** [0.144]
Computer 0.108*** [0.040] 0.143*** [0.040]
Bank account −0.040 [0.095] 0.475*** [0.052]
Transaction internet 0.277*** [0.095] 0.193 [0.141]
Training at the previous firm 0.793*** [0.048] 0.607*** [0.035]
Firm base specification? Yes Yes
Observations 6,679 9,418
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the worker received any formal training
after joining the firm. The table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit
regressions (equation 3 in the text). The regressions control for several firm level characteristics, as it is listed in the
specification reported in column (7) of Tables A5 and A6 of the Appendix. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (3) report the coefficient of the variable, and columns (2) and (4) report standard
errors. These are the same coefficients as column (5) in Tables A7 and A8 of the Appendix.
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of the worker from secondary education onwards and, interestingly, also increases as
individuals hold some degree of vocational training. Women are less likely to receive
on-the-job training in Thailand but not in Malaysia. Workers with longer tenure with
the firm are more likely to receive on-the-job training in both countries. Differences in
the probability to participate in training are not statistically significant when comparing
workers of different ages. In Thailand, training incidence is higher both for skilled and
unskilled production workers than for non-production workers. In Malaysia, we only
find that unskilled production workers are less likely to train than non-production
workers. This might be a result driven by the industries represented in the sample16. In
both countries, we find that workers that belong to a trade union and use a computer
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that have ever made a transaction through the internet also tend to be selected into
training more frequently than those who have never used e-commerce. Moreover, we
also find that current training incidence is very strongly and positively correlated with
past training incidence for both countries.
4. The wage returns to on-the-job training
The accumulation of human capital has long been seen as an investment decision
(Becker, 1964). While investing, each individual gives up some proportion of income
during the education and training period in exchange of increased future earnings. In-
dividuals will be willing to take additional schooling or training if the costs (tuition and
training course fees, forgone earnings while at school and reduced wages during the
training period) are compensated by higher future earnings. Assuming perfectly com-
petitive labor markets, wages reflect the marginal product of workers and should in-
crease with the accumulation of human capital if individuals become more productive
in their current job17.
4.1. Propensity score matching
We use propensity score matching to quantify the wage returns of job training at the
worker level. The main idea underneath the propensity to score matching methodology
is to match as closely as possible individuals who have received training to those not re-
ceiving on-the-job training, to then be able to meaningfully compare the differences in
their wages18.
Let W1i −W0i (4) be the difference between a worker’s log wage Wi that results from
participating in training. If worker i participates in training, he gets wage W1i; and if he
does not receive training, his wage is W0i (Di∈ {0, 1} summarizes worker i’s treatment, 1
and 0 mean, respectively, receiving and not receiving training). We do not observe,
however, the wages of individuals who receive training if they had not received it, that
is W0i, and we do not observe wages for the individuals who were not trained if they
were trained W1i.
As we have argued in a previous section, to assess the impact of job training it is not
enough to compute the average wage difference between the workers that received
training and the ones that did not participate in training. The main reason is that most
likely a large part of this difference can be caused not by training itself but also be
driven by other worker and firm characteristics that determine the selection into train-
ing. The propensity to score matching (PSM) methodology departs from the assump-
tion that all the relevant differences between the treated and the untreated individuals
are captured by their observables. Within the group of the untreated it selects a group
as similar as possible to the treated group. The difference in wages across workers who
received training and this set of workers is a better estimate of the returns to training.
First, given the richness of our data set, we assume that a significant number of worker
and firm variables (X) explain the relevant differences between the treated and the untreated
groups. For consistent estimations it is required that W0i ⊥Di|X where X is the set of ob-
served variables19. However, if X is multidimensional it becomes difficult to match the indi-
viduals. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have proved that W0i ⊥Di|X implies W0i ⊥Di|p(X),
where p(X) are the propensity score fitted values, or the probability of participating in
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training will compose the counterfactual group.
The first step of this method is thus to estimate the probability of each worker to re-
ceive on-the-job training. This is given by the fitted values of the worker level probit re-
gressions for the incidence of training. We consider the specification reported in
Table 2. There, we control for several worker (including education, gender, age, tenure
with the firm, potential experience, marital status, occupation) and firm characteristics
(including firm size, age, export intensity, foreign ownership, education of the work-
force, degree of technological adoption). The reason why we also include firm level
characteristics is to control for the fact that the training decision depends partly on the
firm. By matching workers with similar characteristics and who work for similar firms
we hope to minimize the selection bias that is likely arising from the fact that individ-
uals selected into training may be the ones with higher unobserved ability.
Because the treated individual i can be matched with one or n individuals on the
non-treated group, we choose the one-to-n matching method. This implies that each indi-
vidual in the “treatment” group is matched with a weighted average of all individuals in the
“control” group that have similar fitted values20. After associating each treated individual i
with a mean of untreated individuals with different weights we simply compute the differ-
ence between the averages of the log wages in the treated group and in the control
“weighted average” to quantify the causal effect of on-the-job training on wages.
In Malaysia there is a set of 4,425 untreated individuals and 2,202 treated (a total
support group of 6,627). In Thailand, the set of untreated and treated groups have
4,477 and 4,941 individuals, respectively (9,418 individuals in total). We compute the
average treatment effect on the treated individuals (ATT), yielding the impact of the
training on the set of workers who actually end up receiving it. Table A11, in the Ap-
pendix, reports the balancing tests to check the quality of the matching methodology
to our sample. It is reassuring to see statistically similar means in most of the covariates
for both the treated and the control groups. The only exception is the variable tenure
in Malaysia for which the t-statistic rejects the null hypothesis.
4.2. Empirical results for the returns to training
As mentioned above workers selected into training may receive on average different
wages than those not selected. In this section, we present estimates of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the effect of the training (received since
joining the firm) on the hourly log wages of trained workers. We report both the raw
log wage differences and the ATT using propensity score matching. Table 3 reports that
the raw difference in wages between the treated and the untreated groups is 42.9% for
Malaysia and 28.4% for Thailand. Once we explore the propensity to score matching
methodology, we find that the impact of on-the-job training on hourly wages falls to
7.7% for Malaysia and 4.5% for Thailand, respectively. The estimates are significant at a
5% level of confidence for both countries.
Therefore, Malaysia presents higher returns from job training than Thailand. A priori,
this is not immediate. On the one hand, Malaysia has a higher per capita gross domes-
tic product and also has more youth in schools than Thailand, suggesting that their
returns to human capital could be smaller than in Thailand. On the other hand, the ac-
cumulated stock of capital in Malaysia is higher, and if skills and capital are
Table 3 Wage returns to on-the-job training
Difference in log wages SE t-stat
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Malaysia
Unmatched 0.429*** 0.02 21.9





Unmatched 0.284*** 0.02 15.46




Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table explores the propensity score matching
estimate of equation (4) in the text. Panel A reports the PSM results for the sample of workers in Malaysia, and Panel B
reports the results for the sample of workers in Thailand. Column (1) reports the Average Treatment Effect on the
Treated (ATT). The estimate gives the impact on wages of training for those actually participating in training. Column (2)
reports standard errors and column (3) reports the t-statistic.
Almeida and Faria IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 12 of 332014, 3:19
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/19complementary, all else constant, the returns to human capital could be higher than in
Thailand. Also if training presents decreasing returns, it is reassuring to see that
returns are lower in the country with the highest training incidence: Thailand.
For comparability, in Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix, we show the estimates for
the impact of training on wages, using the least squares methodology (OLS) and con-
sidering alternative specifications. The specification that is closer to the variables we
control in the PSM estimates is reported in column (3). Comparing columns (1) and
(3) in Tables A9 and A10, we see that the wage difference between trainees and non-
trainees falls from 43.1% to 4.3% in Malaysia and from 28.4% to 4.2% in Thailand. Even
though the numbers are very similar for Thailand and for Malaysia, the OLS estimates
are lower than the PSM estimates, suggesting that least squares estimates have a down-
ward bias.5. Heterogeneity analysis
Until now we assumed that returns to on-the-job training are the same for all the
workers and firms within each country. In this section, we allow for the returns to be
different by two fundamental worker characteristics: gender and education. Our results
show that the returns to training are higher for men than for women in Malaysia, and
for workers with completed secondary education or more education in both countries,
when compared with workers that have not completed secondary education.
Table 4 reports the main results for the sample of men and women, separately. Panel A
reports the results for Malaysia, while Panel B reports the results for Thailand. Table 4
shows that, in Malaysia, wage returns are higher for men than for women. Men present
wage returns to on-the-job training of 11%, while there are no statistically significant
Table 4 Wage returns to on-the-job training, by gender
Sample of men Sample of women
Difference in log wages SE t-stat Difference in log wages SE t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Malaysia









Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table uses propensity score matching to
estimate equation (4) in the text. We estimate separate regressions by gender. Columns (1) and (4) report Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) which evaluates the wage impact of training for those actually participating in
training. Columns (2) and (5) report standard errors. Columns (3) and (6) report the t-statistic. Treated individuals are
those who have participated in training and the untreated individuals are the “control group” that is similar for all
characteristics to the treated group except for the fact of receiving training. Panel A reports the estimates for the sample
of workers in Malaysia, and Panel B reports the estimates for the sample of workers in Thailand.
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of the job market more frequently than men and thus may be less likely to receive on-the-
job training. This higher turnover may also make it difficult to appropriate the returns
from the investments in job training. We do not find, however, that same result for
Thailand. There the wage returns to job training are quantitatively larger for men than for
women, although for men they are not statistically different from zero (at a 10% level).
Table 5 reports the estimates for the samples of workers that have completed at least
secondary education and for the sample of workers with less education. Panel A shows
the results for Malaysia, and Panel B shows the results for Thailand. Consistent also
with the findings of others in the literature, we show that the returns to on-the-job
training are higher for workers that have completed at least secondary education than
for workers with less education. Workers with completed secondary education have
returns to training of 9% in Malaysia and of 10% in Thailand. In contrast, for those
workers without completed secondary schooling, there are no statistically significant
returns to on-the-job training in both countries.6. Conclusion
In developing countries, governments are increasingly concerned with the rapidly chan-
ging demand for skills and the slow response of the general and vocational schooling
tracks. As a consequence, many employers complain about the lack of skills and educa-
tion of their workforce. Policymakers are thus increasingly concerned that the supply of
skills in the market does not keep pace with the demand and think about the design of
policies to address this problem. The investment in on-the-job training is one import-
ant way to mitigate this gap by developing job relevant skills among the workforce.
Table 5 Estimated wage returns to job training, by level of education
Workers completed secondary education
or more years of schooling
Workers with up to incomplete
secondary education
Difference in log wages SE t-stat Difference in log wages SE t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Malaysia









Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The table uses propensity score matching to
estimate equation (4) in the text. We estimate separate regressions by education group. Columns (1) to (3) refer to the
sample of workers that have completed secondary education or more. Columns (4) through (6) refer to workers with
lower levels of education (that is those with up to incomplete secondary education). Columns (1) and (4) report ATT
(Average Treatment Effect on the Treated), it evaluates the wage impact of training for those actually participating in
training. Columns (2) and (5) report standard errors, and columns (3) and (6) report the t-statistic. Treated individuals are
those who have participated in training, and the untreated individuals are the “control group” that is similar for all
characteristics to the treated group except for the fact of receiving training. Panel A reports the estimates for the sample
of workers in Malaysia, and Panel B reports the estimates for the sample of workers in Thailand.
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measurement of returns to training presents several challenges, and this is the rea-
son why we find so different results in the literature. Variables are usually not com-
parable across studies, and sometimes data-sets do not allow for an accurate
estimation of the results.
In this paper we quantify the wage returns from on-the-job training in Malaysia and
in Thailand exploring a unique data set matching workers and firms. Using a matching
estimators method to control for the selection bias we find returns of 7.7% and 4.5%
for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively. In Malaysia, we find that returns are clearly
higher for men than for women. Workers that have completed secondary education or
more also show higher wage returns than those who have not completed secondary
schooling. Economic theory tells us that the wage effects are a lower bound estimate
for the effect of training in productivity. Therefore the productivity impact of training
in these countries should be even higher than the estimated values.Endnotes
1We will explore the Enterprise Surveys collected by the World Bank. In each
country the survey inquires whether the firms invested in formal on-the-job training
programs. This paper restricts the attention to employer provided formal on-the-job
training programs. It will not address informal job relevant training. Johanson and
Wanga (2008) present evidence for wage returns to training in the informal sector.
Kahyarara and Teal (2008) discuss the link between other types of training and labor
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et al. Völter (2007) study the effects of public training in helping the transitions
between unemployment and employment, and Frazer (2005) studies the effectiveness
of training for the self-employed in developing countries.
2These figures mean that Thailand presents a per capita GDP similar to countries
such as Peru, El Salvador and Tunisia whereas Malaysia is closer to countries like
Latvia Lithuania and Chile.
3See Panel B of Table A1 in the Appendix for a summary of the papers that have ana-
lyzed wage returns to training in developing countries.
4There are some empirical papers that use firm level data to try evaluate the im-
pact of offered training on the firms’ productivity (e.g. Almeida and Carneiro 2008;
Barret and O’Connell 1999) and on average wages (Lopez-Acevedo and Tan 2003).
5Few empirical papers have looked at the extent to which the benefits of training
(ultimately effects on higher firm productivity) are shared with workers. One exception
is Dearden et al. (2006) for the UK.
6Panels C and D summarize the works using firm and industry level data.
7For example, some papers have defined training incidence with a dummy variable
capturing whether training was offered over the previous year to the survey. Others,
like Bassinini et al. (2005) use the accumulated stock of training hours over the sample
period (6 years). Moreover, the reduced form estimated typically depends on the data
available, which in turn differs across data sets and countries. For a similar point see
Haelermans and Borghans (2012).
8Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002, 2004) use two different methods to estimate the
returns to training in Holland. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002) identify individuals plan-
ning to enroll in a training program but did not do so due to a random event and find
evidence of no returns to job training. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) explore a discon-
tinuity which allowed firms to reduce their training expenses only for workers more
than 40 years old Although their results are just valid locally, they also conclude that
there were no returns from the investment in job training. Similarly, Sousounis (2009)
explores longitudinal data and does not find evidence that training increases wages in
the U.K. between 1998 and 2005.
9The information collected in the Enterprise Surveys is based on one to two hour in-
terviews with the firm manager. This data set has been used for studying this and other
topics (see e.g. Almeida and Aterido, 2011, Almeida and Carneiro, 2008a, Almeida and
Fernandes, 2008). Previous versions of this project within the World Bank include the
Regional Program on Enterprise Development collecting firm and worker level data in
Sub-Saharan Africa countries for a decade (e.g., Rosholm et al. 2007, Frazer 2006) and
the World Business Environment Survey.
10In the Malaysian sample we have firms from the Central Region: Selangor, KL,
Melaka (4,641 observations); the North Region: Penang, Kedah (1,899 observations);
the South Region: Johor (3,290 observations); the East Coast: Terengganu (181
observations); the Northeast (320 observations) and the South (390 observations). In
Thailand firms in the sample operate in the North (730 observations); the Centre
(3,260 observations); Bangkok and Vicinity (6,160 observations); the East (1,920 ob-
servations); the Northeast (320 observations) and the South (390 observations).
11The survey asks: “Did you receive formal training at the previous employer?”
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The training incidence in Malaysia is 49% only for the manufacturing sector.
13In particular, firms are asked “Did the employees share the cost of training?”
14We report log hourly wages in USD in 2002 prices for Malaysia and 2004 prices for
Thailand.
15We assume that a firm offers formal training to a worker if there is a net posi-
tive benefit of this investment. The main difference is that now the benefits should
also be a function of the worker level observable characteristics, captured by Xijfr. In
this case, the probability of a worker i being employed in firm j is determined by
his characteristics (Xijfr) and the firm characteristics (Zjfr) so that Pr(Trainijfr = 1) =
Pr(υijfr > Xijfr − δZjfr − μf − μr) (3).
16As explained in section 2 of the text our sample only includes formal manufactur-
ing firms.
17With imperfect competition wages do not necessarily reflect labor productivity and
therefore might not reflect changes in the worker’s productivity.
18For another application of this method see Rosholm et al. (2007), and for a
complete theoretical discussion of the matching estimators see Heckman et al. (1999).
19This is defined, in the econometric literature, as Conditional Independence Assumption
(CIA).
20A normal kernel is used to define the weights.
21The worker variables included were: educational attainment, gender, age, tenure
in the firm, years of labor market experience, marital status, occupation, whether
the individual is member of a labor union, owns a computer, a bank account, has
ever made an internet transaction and whether the worker received training at a
previous employer.
22In addition to the worker variables we described in the previous footnote we in-
clude the following firm characteristics: size, foreign capital participation, exports, aver-
age years of education of the work force, education of the manager, introduction of
new production technologies, industry and region.
23Tables A9 and A10, in the Appendix, report the results for the worker variables in-
cluded in the regressions. We focus on the findings in column (3). The estimates show
that, in both countries, the returns to schooling are increasing with the level of formal
education completed. Women and unionized workers earn lower wages than men and
non-unionized workers. Wages also tend to increase with age, tenure and experience.
Moreover, wages for managers and professionals are higher than the wages of non-
production workers (omitted occupation group) and skilled production, unskilled pro-
duction in both countries. Finally, those that report having a computer at home, a bank
account, and using the internet regularly also report higher wages. The same happens
for those individuals reporting having received training with their previous employer.
Perhaps surprisingly, in Malaysia, we find that returns from past training are higher
than returns from more recent training events (6.8% vs. 4.3%), as we expect training to
depreciate with time.Appendix
A1. Additional tables (Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A11)
Table A1 Review of the literature on wage returns of job training
Panel A: Papers using worker level data - developed countries
Name of study Data, country and
time period






Worker Level Data for
Europe (1995-2001)
log hourly wage sum over the sample period
(6 years) of training events
age, gender, marital status,








Worker Level Data for
Europe (1995-2001)
log hourly wage dummy: having participated
in training between January
of the previous year and the
date of the interview
gender, educational attainment,
potential labour market
experience, firm size, industry
affiliation, working time,
occupation, seniority







Worker Level Data for
Portugal (1998-2000)
log hourly wage dummy: having ever
participated in training
age, experience, schooling (and
interactions between these
variables and training), part time,
tenure, sector, firm size.
12% for men and
37% for women
Yes
Excluded instruments (selection model):




Worker Level Data for
U.K. (1992,1997)
log hourly wage dummies: having
participated in training in the
previews 4, 3, 2, and 1
quarters
age, gender, occupation, dummy







Worker Level Data for
Holland (2001)
log hourly wage dummy: having participated
in training in the previous 12
months
age, gender, schooling, firm size. Not statistically
different from zero
Yes
Randomization: control group composed
by people that were planning to engage
in a training activity by did not because
of some random event.
Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2004)
Worker Level Data for
Holland (1999)
log hourly wage dummy: having participated
in training in the previous 12
months





They use the RD data design method.
They explore the discontinuity introduced
by a new tax law that allows tax deduction
for firms’ expenditures on training for
workers with more than 40 years. So the
decision of training workers around age 40
suffers and will be influenced by an























Table A1 Review of the literature on wage returns of job training (Continued)
Lillard and Tan
(1986)
Worker Level Data for
U.S.A. (1983)
log annual wage dummies: having
participated in training
(formal and informal) in the
current job
experience, schooling, tenure,
union member, dummy for non-
white, tenure, region, long run






Sousounis (2009) Worker Level Data for
U.K. (1998-2005)
log weekly wage dummy: having participated
in training in the previous 12
months
age, gender, marital status,
dummy for having children with
less than 12 years in the
household, race, schooling,
dummies for having changed job,
private sector, part time
managerial position, supervisor,







Panel B:Papers using worker level data - developing countries
Name of study Country and time
period
Dependent variable Training Other independent variables Effects training on
wages
Controls endogeneity training
Chung (2000) Worker Level Data for
Malaysia (1976, 1988)
log hourly wage dummy: having ever
participated in training
age, marital status, nationality,
schooling, dummies for





Excluded instruments (selection model):
having a bank account, level of education
in 1976, and parents occupational status.
Frazer (2006) Worker Level Data for
Ghana (1991-1999)






for the whole sample





Worker Level Data for
Tanzania (2006)
log hourly wage dummy: having ever
participated in training (per




schooling, rural dummy and
region.
38% for on-the-job
training, 27% for for-
mal apprenticeship,
47% for vocational


























Table A1 Review of the literature on wage returns of job training (Continued)
Kahyarara and Teal
(2008)
Worker Level Data for
Tanzania (1997-2000)
log monthly wage dummies: current and past
on-the-job training and go-
ing on a short training




dummy for capital city, firm fixed
effects.
22% for current on-
the-job training, not
statistically different
from zero for past
on-the-job training





Worker Level Data for
Ghana (1984, 2000)
log monthly wage dummy: having participated
in an apprenticeship
gender, potential experience,
schooling, log hours worked per
week, IQ score, interaction
between apprenticeship and
schooling, city.





Members of the household that also
made an apprenticeship, dummy for
household access to credit, and a
dummy for having internal piped water







log monthly wage dummy: having participated
in training in the previous 12
months
age, ethnicity, experience, gender,
occupation, schooling, tenure,
union participation and familiar
relations within the owners of the
firm, ownership, industry, location,
size, financial situation, skill
demand, turnover, unionization,
training annual expenses.





Matching Estimators Method (Local
Linear Matching)




log hourly wage dummy: having received
formal on the job training
since having joined the firm
educational attainment, gender,




training at a previous employer,
size, foreign capital, exports,
education of the work force,
education of the manager, new
production technologies, industry,
region.
7.7% for Malysia and
4.5% for Thailand.
Yes
























Table A1 Review of the literature on wage returns of job training (Continued)
Panel C: Papers using firm level data
Name of study Data, country and
time period





Firm Level Data for
Portugal (1995-1999)
log value added per
employee
average number of hours of
training per employee
log employees, log capital stock,
share occupation group, share
low educated workers, share
males workforce, cubic
polynomial on average wage





First differences, GMM: past level of
















for labor incentives strategies.









Firm Level Data for
Mexico (1992, 1999)
log monthly wage dummy: firm offered training
in the previous 12 months
average years of schooling of the
workforce, percentage of women,
occupation, ownership, exports,
size, industry and region
Training returns
increased from 5% to
7% from 1992 to
1999.
Yes
Excluded instruments (selection model):
years in operation, R&D, computerization,
unionization.
Panel D: Papers using industry level data
Name of study Country and time
period







log hourly wage industry aggregated
incidence for training in the
previous 4 weeks
log capital per worker, log hours
per worker, log of R&D over sales,
region, time and tenure dummies,
































Table A2 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Firm training Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm offered formal training to its workers in
the previous year.
Micro, small, medium, large,
and very large
Dummy variables equal to 1 if the total number of employees in the firm is
between 1 and 9, between 10 and 49, between 50 and 99, between 100 and
249 or greater than 250, respectively.
Sector Two digit industries/services: Food Processing; Textiles; Garments; Wood
Products/Furniture; Pharmaceuticals/Chemicals; Rubber and Plastics, Household
Electrical Appliances; Electronics; Automobiles parts; Machinery and Equipment
/ Information Technology; Communication Services; Accounting and Related
Services; Advertising and Marketing; Business Logistics.
Full foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 100% of the firm's capital is owned by foreigners.
Majority foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if more than 50% and less than 100% of the firm's
capital is owned by foreigners.
Minority foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if more than 0% but less than 50% of the firm's
capital is owned by foreigners.
Domestic Dummy variable equal to 1 if 100% of the firm's capital is owned by domestic
entities.
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports are more than 10% of its sales
Share of skilled workers Percentage of the firm's workforce that are managers, professionals or skilled
production workers.
Education labor force Average years of schooling of the workforce.
Age firm Year of the survey minus the year when the firm started operations.
Education of manager Dummy variable equal to 1 if the manager of the firm owns a degree.
New production technology Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced in the previous two years a
new technology that substantially changed production.
Training in the firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker received formal training since he
joined the firm.
Hourly wage Hourly wage in USD (exchange rate at the time of the survey)
Ln wage Natural logarithm of hourly wage.
Woman Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is a woman.
Age of worker Age of the worker
Level of education Dummy variables equal to 1 if the highest level of formal education of the worker is
a degree, diploma, upper secondary, lower secondary, primary, respectively.
Vocational education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker received vocational education.
Potential experience Year of the survey minus the year when the worker found his first permanent job.
Tenure with the firm Year of the survey minus the year when the worker joined the firm.
Single Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is single
Native Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is from the same country were the
firm is registered.
Studied abroad Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker studied abroad.
Unionized Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker belongs to a trade union.
Occupation dummies Dummy variables equal to 1 if the employee works as a manager, professional,
skill production worker, unskilled production worker, non-production worker,
apprentice, respectively.
Computer Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker owns a personal computer at home.
Bank account Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker has a bank account.
Transaction internet Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker has ever bought or sold a good
through the internet.
Training other firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker received formal training at the
previous employer.
Source: Enterprise Surveys (World Bank), Malaysia (2002) and Thailand (2004).
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Table A3 Summary statistics of the main firm level characteristics
Variable Malaysia Thailand
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm training 1,145 0.51 1,385 0.76
In-house training 551 0.30 1,006 0.46
Outside training 570 0.11 1,049 0.08
Share costs with employees 553 0.05 1,056 0.03
Size
Micro 1,148 0.06 1,385 0.02
Small 1,148 0.43 1,385 0.28
Medium 1,148 0.20 1,385 0.19
Large 1,148 0.16 1,385 0.23
Very large 1,148 0.15 1,385 0.29
Ownership
Full foreign-owned 1,128 0.13 1,384 0.07
Majority foreign-owned 1,128 0.07 1,384 0.06
Minority foreign-owned 1,128 0.10 1,384 0.13
Domestic 1,128 0.70 1,384 0.74
Exporter 941 0.67 1,385 0.62
Share of skilled workers 1,149 0.49 1,385 0.24
Education labor force 1,149 10.12 1,385 9.73
Sector
Food processing 1,152 0.18 1,385 0.13
Textiles 1,152 0.03 1,385 0.13
Garments 1,152 0.09 1,385 0.12
Automobiles parts 1,152 0.03 1,385 0.10
Electronics 1,152 0.07 1,385 0.11
Rubber and plastics 1,152 0.22 1,385 0.06
Wood products/furniture 1,152 0.00 1,385 0.17
Machinery and equipment 1,152 0.07 1,385 0.09
Pharmaceuticals/chemicals 1,152 0.03 - -
Household electrical appliances 1,152 0.08 - -
Information technology 1,152 0.03 - -
Communication services 1,152 0.01 - -
Accounting and related services 1,152 0.09 - -
Advertising and marketing 1,152 0.02 - -
Business logistics 1,152 0.08 - -
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: Table reports the means of variables listed in the table. Column (1) reports the means for the sample of firms in
Malaysia, and column (2) reports the means for the sample of firms in Thailand.
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Table A4 Summary statistics of the main worker level characteristics
Variable Malaysia Thailand
(1) (2)
Training in the firm 0.33 0.52
Hourly wages 0.41 −0.14
Woman 0.44 0.55




Upper secondary 0.36 0.20
Lower secondary 0.27 0.18
Primary 0.15 0.30
Illiterate 0.01 0.00
Vocational education 0.15 0.06
Potential experience 13.61 13.85
Tenure with the firm 7.24 5.55
Single 0.35 0.36





Skill production 0.36 0.29




Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: Table reports the means of variables listed in the table. Column (1) reports the means for the sample of workers in
Malaysia, and column (2) reports the means for the sample of workers is Thailand. The wage variables are in USD at
current prices at the time of the survey.
Table A5 Average marginal effects for Malaysian firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Small 0.182** 0.158* 0.166* 0.151* 0.182** 0.180* 0.167*
[0.082] [0.088] [0.089] [0.087] [0.092] [0.093] [0.100]
Medium 0.410*** 0.384*** 0.404*** 0.379*** 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.373***
[0.063] [0.072] [0.072] [0.073] [0.076] [0.077] [0.085]
Large 0.516*** 0.487*** 0.503*** 0.483*** 0.462*** 0.455*** 0.475***
[0.043] [0.057] [0.056] [0.057] [0.062] [0.064] [0.068]
Very large 0.589*** 0.574*** 0.588*** 0.573*** 0.560*** 0.549*** 0.564***
[0.029] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.042] [0.046] [0.048]
Age firm −0.005 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Exporter 0.243*** 0.250*** 0.244*** 0.240*** 0.228*** 0.240***
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049]
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Table A5 Average marginal effects for Malaysian firms (Continued)
Minority foreign ownership 0.052 0.043 0.04 −0.002 −0.005 0.011
[0.065] [0.065] [0.066] [0.068] [0.069] [0.071]
Majority foreign ownership 0.059 0.047 0.049 0.028 0.024 0.043
[0.077] [0.079] [0.078] [0.079] [0.078] [0.079]
Full foreign ownership 0.131** 0.121** 0.121** 0.100 0.107* 0.113*
[0.058] [0.059] [0.059] [0.062] [0.064] [0.067]
Share of skilled workers 0.180** - - - -
[0.071]
Education labor force 0.014*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.008*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Education of manager 0.228*** 0.234*** 0.234***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.043]
New production technology 0.136*** 0.126***
[0.045] [0.047]
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry-region fixed effects? No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1,132 910 909 909 890 887 869
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offered formal on-the-job training to
its employees. The table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit
regressions. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All
variables are defined in Table A2. Micro firms (with less than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Age squared is also
included in the regressions (not reported). Industry fixed effects refer to 2 digit industry or service.
Table A6 Average marginal effects for Thai Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Small 0.055 0.045 0.041 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.072
[0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.058] [0.059] [0.057] [0.060]
Medium 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.170***
[0.037] [0.039] [0.039] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.039]
Large 0.253*** 0.235*** 0.232*** 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.240*** 0.238***
[0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.035]
Very large 0.326*** 0.299*** 0.295*** 0.318*** 0.310*** 0.296*** 0.279***
[0.039] [0.040] [0.041] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.041]
Age firm 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Exporter 0.059** 0.060** 0.049* 0.045 0.042 0.048*
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Minority foreign ownership 0.004 0.004 −0.006 −0.008 −0.009 −0.002
[0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]
Majority foreign ownership 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.105** 0.104** 0.099** 0.117***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.045] [0.046] [0.048] [0.040]
Full foreign ownership −0.031 −0.03 −0.062 −0.069 −0.073 −0.042
[0.067] [0.067] [0.069] [0.070] [0.072] [0.064]
Share of skilled workers −0.035 - - - -
[0.049]
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Table A6 Average marginal effects for Thai Firms (Continued)
Education labor force 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.021***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Education of manager 0.059** 0.051** 0.071***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
New production technology 0.078*** 0.085***
[0.023] [0.023]
Industry fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry-region fixed effects? No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1,278 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,348
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offered formal on-the-job training to
its employees. The table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the firm's propensity to train from probit
regressions. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All
variables are defined in Table A2. Micro firms (with less than 10 employees) is the omitted size group. Age squared is also
included in the regressions (not reported). Industry fixed effects refer to 2 digit industry or service.
Table A7 Average marginal effects for Malaysian workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree 0.713*** 0.653*** 0.649*** 0.606*** 0.523***
[0.181] [0.182] [0.184] [0.184] [0.186]
Diploma 0.783*** 0.730*** 0.726*** 0.711*** 0.608***
[0.176] [0.177] [0.179] [0.179] [0.180]
Upper secondary 0.552*** 0.521*** 0.516*** 0.514*** 0.458***
[0.170] [0.170] [0.171] [0.171] [0.172]
Lower secondary 0.308* 0.287* 0.283* 0.282 0.266
[0.170] [0.170] [0.172] [0.171] [0.172]
Primary 0.026 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.036
[0.175] [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] [0.176]
Vocational education 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.101**
[0.048] [0.048] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049]
Woman −0.095*** −0.098*** −0.099*** −0.095*** −0.071
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038]
Age of worker 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.020
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Tenure with the firm 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.069***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.001]
Potential experience −0.011 −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.032***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Single −0.180*** −0.182*** −0.182*** −0.181*** −0.146***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045]
Manager 0.142** 0.128** 0.129** 0.117** 0.060
[0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] [0.066]
Professional 0.165** 0.157 0.157 0.153 0.118
[0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.078]
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Table A7 Average marginal effects for Malaysian workers (Continued)
Skill Production −0.031 −0.021 −0.021 −0.018 −0.017
[0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054]
Unskilled Production −0.298*** −0.280*** −0.279*** −0.276*** −0.269***
[0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.062]
Apprentice 0.433 0.453 0.455 0.462 0.506**
[0.203] [0.203] [0.203] [0.203] [0.204]
Unionized 0.522*** 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.514*** 0.531***
[0.087] [0.087] [0.088] [0.088] [0.088]
Computer 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.108***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040]
Bank Account 0.019 0.016 −0.040
[0.095] [0.095] [0.095]
Transaction Internet 0.334*** 0.277***
[0.094] [0.095]
Training at the Previous Firm 0.793***
[0.048]
Observations 6,679 6,679 6,679 6,679 6,679
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the received formal on-the-job training since he
joined the firm. The table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the worker's propensity to be trained from
probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
All variables are defined in Table A2. Firm Base Specification is the same as in column (7) of Table A5. Illiterate and
Non-production workers are the omitted education and occupation groups. Age squared, Tenure squared and Experience
squared are also included in the regressions (not reported).
Table A8 Average marginal effects for Thai workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree 0.797*** 0.717*** 0.593*** 0.586*** 0.426**
[0.210] [0.211] [0.216] [0.216] [0.215]
Diploma 0.662*** 0.617*** 0.494*** 0.493*** 0.353
[0.210] [0.211] [0.215] [0.216] [0.215]
Upper secondary 0.484*** 0.463*** 0.347* 0.345 0.226
[0.207] [0.208] [0.212] [0.212] [0.212]
Lower secondary 0.340 0.334 0.239 0.237 0.114
[0.207] [0.208] [0.212] [0.212] [0.211]
Primary 0.116 0.119 0.051 0.049 −0.034
[0.205] [0.206] [0.210] [0.210] [0.209]
Vocational education 0.075 0.067 0.058 0.050 −0.015
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.059]
Woman −0.048* −0.046* −0.066** −0.066** −0.072*
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
Age of worker 0.025 0.026* 0.023 0.023 0.020
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Tenure with the firm 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.100***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Potential experience 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 −0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
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Table A8 Average marginal effects for Thai workers (Continued)
Single 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.022
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Manager −0.002 −0.042 −0.047 −0.065 −0.087
[0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.070]
Professional −0.021 −0.041 −0.047 −0.051 −0.055
[0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059]
Skill production 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.181***
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.046]
Unskilled production 0.218*** 0.229*** 0.239*** 0.237*** 0.225***
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.047]
Apprentice −0.291 −0.281 −0.272 −0.272 −0.234
[0.173] [0.173] [0.173] [0.173] [0.174]
Unionized 0.635*** 0.636*** 0.635*** 0.637*** 0.628***
[0.143] [0.143] [0.143] [0.143] [0.144]
Computer 0.177*** 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.143***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040]
Bank account 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.475***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052]
Transaction internet 0.293** 0.193
[0.140] [0.141]
Training at the previous firm 0.607***
[0.014]
Observations 9,418 9,418 9,418 9,418 9,418
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the received formal on-the-job training since he
joined the firm. The table reports the marginal effects (at mean values) on the worker's propensity to be trained from
probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
All variables are defined in Table A2. Firm Base Specification is the same as in column (7) of Table A6. Illiterate and Non-
production workers are the omitted education and occupation groups. Age squared, Tenure squared and Experience
squared are also included in the regressions (not reported).
Table A9 Wage returns to job training in Malaysia
(1) (2) (3)






Upper secondary 0.209*** 0.187***
[0.067] [0.061]




Vocational education 0.114*** 0.075***
[0.023] [0.020]
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Table A9 Wage returns to job training in Malaysia (Continued)
Woman −0.203*** −0.187***
[0.019] [0.018]
Age of worker 0.031*** 0.029***
[0.008] [0.008]
Tenure with the firm 0.027*** 0.027***
[0.005] [0.004]








Skill production −0.079*** −0.091***
[0.033] [0.028]








Bank account 0.179*** 0.130***
[0.041] [0.041]
Transaction internet 0.175*** 0.094**
[0.062] [0.048]
Training at the previous firm 0.091*** 0.068***
[0.026] [0.026]
Firm base specification No No Yes
Observations 6,679 6,679 6,679
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: The table reports the estimates for equation 5 in the text. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in
brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage.
Column (1) only controls for job training, column (2) adds baseline worker characteristics as in column (8) of Table A7
and A8. Column (3) adds firm baseline characteristics as in column (7) of Tables A5 and A6. Illiterate and Non-production
workers are the omitted education and occupation groups. Age squared, Tenure squared and Experience squared are
also included in the regressions (not reported).
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Table A10 Wage returns to job training in Thailand
(1) (2) (3)






Upper secondary 0.295*** 0.283***
[0.061] [0.066]








Age of worker 0.026*** 0.022***
[0.007] [0.006]
Tenure with the firm 0.035*** 0.032***
[0.004] [0.004]








Skill production −0.025 −0.020
[0.018] [0.019]








Bank account 0.111*** 0.087***
[0.019] [0.019]
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Table A10 Wage returns to job training in Thailand (Continued)
Transaction internet 0.312*** 0.281***
[0.064] [0.060]
Training at the previous firm 0.011 0.027**
[0.016] [0.015]
Firm base specification No No Yes
Observations 9418 9418 9418
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: The table reports the estimates for equation 5 in the text. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in
brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage.
Column (1) only controls for job training, column (2) adds baseline worker characteristics as in column (8) of Table A7
and A8. Column (3) adds firm baseline characteristics as in column (7) of Tables A5 and A6. Illiterate and Non-production
workers are the omitted education and occupation groups. Age squared, Tenure squared and Experience squared are
also included in the regressions (not reported).
Table A11 Balancing tests
Malaysia Thailand
Treated means Matched means T-test Treated means Matched means T-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Training other firm 0.323 0.332 −0.62 0.322 0.310 1.27
Woman 0.424 0.436 −0.17 0.558 0.554 0.41
Age of worker 33.396 32.930 1.88 32.610 32.605 0.04
Education
Degree 0.137 0.136 0.02 0.257 0.253 0.47
Diploma 0.193 0.200 −0.61 0.134 0.139 −0.69
Upper secondary 0.416 0.408 0.54 0.216 0.220 −0.50
Lower secondary 0.197 0.193 0.34 0.170 0.163 0.84
Primary 0.052 0.055 −0.48 0.220 0.221 −0.15
Illiterate 0.001 0.003 −0.77 0.003 0.003 −0.18
Vocational education 0.237 0.259 −1.72 0.070 0.072 −0.40
Potential experience 12.654 12.140 2.10 14.021 13.802 0.80
Tenure with the firm 7.566 6.996 3.14 6.107 6.055 0.52
Single 0.317 0.342 −1.77 0.366 0.368 −0.21
Studied abroad 0.079 0.073 0.71 0.011 0.012 −0.70
Unionized 0.075 0.070 0.63 0.021 0.018 1.47
Occupation
Managers 0.208 0.204 0.31 0.075 0.078 −0.52
Professionals 0.134 0.146 −1.19 0.098 0.094 0.70
Skill production 0.344 0.339 0.30 0.300 0.295 0.58
Unskilled production 0.119 0.122 −0.31 0.332 0.320 1.17
Non-production 0.186 0.177 0.76 0.190 0.207 −2.12
Apprentice 0.010 0.011 −0.44 0.004 0.005 −0.60
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Note: The table reports balancing tests between the sample means of the variables listed. We contrast the means of the
subsample of treated and untreated individuals. The t-test reported in column (3) and (6) for Malaysia and Thailand,
respectively, verifies if the difference between the means of the variables reported is, for each country, statistically
different from zero across the two samples. Treated individuals are those that participated in training, and untreated
individuals are those reporting not having participated in training.
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Following Mincer, 1974, we assume that (log) wages are a linear function of several hu-
man capital and other worker characteristics, and of firm characteristics:
lnwij ¼ βTrainij þ λXij þ φZj þ εij ð5Þ
where wij is the worker’s hourly wage (local currency) for worker i in firm j, Trainij is
a dummy variable equal to one if the worker received formal training since he joined
firm j, Xij is a vector of the worker’s characteristics, Zj is a vector of firm level charac-
teristics and εij captures the unobserved characteristics of worker i in firm j correlated
with hourly wages. Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient β. β captures the
percentage point difference in the hourly wage for workers who have received formal
on-the-job training in firm j. We estimate equation 1 with least squares and cluster the
standard errors at the firm level.
The least squares estimates for β are consistent if Trainij is uncorrelated with the
error termεij. However, this assumption may not hold. On the one hand, there is likely
self selection into on-the-job training. We have shown that workers with certain ob-
servable characteristics (and most likely also unobservable) are more likely to have
taken on-the-job training programs than others. Therefore, it is possible that the higher
earnings for those who are trained are caused not by training itself but because those
taking up training could have a greater earning capacity and ability than the non-
trainees. In this case, the least squares estimates of β will probably be upward biased
due to a possible “ability bias”. On the other hand, if the variable on-the-job training is
measured with error, the least squares estimates could be downward biased. Therefore
the overall sign of the least square bias is unclear.
We minimize the first problem by accounting in the reduced form for several observ-
able individual and firms characteristics simultaneously correlated with training and
also with hourly wages. In particular, in Xij we include detailed information on school-
ing, gender, age, tenure in the firm, potential experience, marital status, occupation,
ethnicity and age. In Zj we include information on firm size, foreign ownership, ex-
ports, average schooling of the workforce, managerial ability, degree of technological
innovation, industry and geographical location of the firm.
Tables A9 and A10 report the least square estimates for β when exploring different
specifications and after clustering the standard errors at the firm level. Column (1) con-
trols only for training incidence since joining the firm, column (2) adds the baseline
worker characteristics (as in column (6) of Tables A7 and A8)21, column (3) adds the
baseline firm characteristics (reported in column (7) of Tables A5 and A6)22 to the spe-
cification in column (3).
The OLS estimates strongly suggest that there are positive returns to the investment
in on-the-job training in both countries. As expected, the magnitude of the returns de-
creases as we introduce additional firm and worker controls. In Table A9, the wage
returns of on-the-job training for Malaysia start at 43.1% but fall to 8.1% when we con-
trol for worker characteristics and to 4.3% once we control for firm characteristics.
Table A10 reports similar findings for Thailand. Returns start at 28.4% falling to
6.2% when we include workers characteristics and to 4.2% when we include firm
characteristics23.
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